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The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is the
federal agency charged with setting and enforcing standards under the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHAct). 1 The typical re-
sponse available to OSHA for the vast majority of violations of the Act is
the post-hoc civil citation and fine. Both the framers of the OSHAct and
subsequent critics, however, have realized that in some situations ex-
traordinary measures are necessary. It is upon those extraordinary mea-
sures that this Note focuses. The Note argues that the most severe sanc-
tions and remedies established in the OSHAct, and the circumstances
under which they are imposed, are poorly suited to affecting the behavior
of the most dangerous employers. The primary failures of the Act ad-
dressed here are 1) that the criminal sanction, included in the Act as the
supposed "big gun" of the enforcement arsenal, is inherently ineffective in
this regulatory context; 2) that the Act's civil enforcement provisions are
too weak and narrow to effect OSHA's statutory mandate; and 3) that the
emphasis in the Act on "willful" and lethal violations as the most seri-
ously sanctioned violations is inappropriate. In response to these problems,
the Note advocates giving OSHA the power to issue broad orders impos-
ing prospective safety programs on particularly recidivous employers.
I. A Brief Description of the Current Statutory Sanctions and Remedies
The OSHAct authorizes OSHA to promulgate specific standards of in-
dustrial safety.2 Through a system of on-site inspections, OSHA enforces
those specific standards as well as the "general duty" of employers to pro-
vide a safe workplace.' Inspectors are empowered to issue a range of cita-
tions for violations, which can carry either civil or criminal penalties.4
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1976 & Supp. 1980). OSHA is an agency within the Department of
Labor.
2. 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1976).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 657-58 (1976) (establishing procedures for inspection and citation). See also 29
US.C. § 654 (1976) (establishing duties of employers).
4. See 29 U.S.C. § 666 (1976) (describing possible citations). If an employer chooses to contest a
civil citation, the employer is entitled to formal adjudicatory proceedings before the Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC), an adjudicatory federal agency extrinsic to the
Department of Labor. 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1976). Initial hearings are before an administrative law
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Section 666 of the OSHAct contains a collection of criteria by which vio-
lations are divided hierarchically into classes.' "Serious" violations are
distingushed from "non-serious" violations by the presence of a "substan-
tial probability that death or serious physical harm could result."6 Unless
a violation is explicitly cited as "willful or repeated," it carries a maxi-
mum penalty of a $1000 civil fine. "Willful or repeated" violations, the
most seriously sanctioned class of civil violations, carry a civil fine of up to
$10,000 each.7 Criminal penalties are available under the Act only when
a violation is "willfully" committed, and "cause[s] death to any em-
ployee."' The maximum criminal penalties are a $10,000 fine, six months
in prison, or both.9
OSHA's power to require particular prospective remedies takes two
forms. When OSHA cites any violation, it is empowered to "fix a reason-
able time for the abatement of the violation."' 0 If this "abatement order"
is not satisfied within the fixed time, OSHA may issue an additional cita-
tion for failure to correct." Such "abatement violations" can carry a fine
of up to $1000 per day. OSHA policy generally limits the overall fine to
ten times the daily penalty, again resulting in a $10,000 maximum fine.12
OSHA's second prospective remedial power is its ability to seek tempo-
rary restraining orders and injunctions to avert any "imminent danger."' 3
The courts and the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
(OSHRC),' 4 however, have consistently construed this injunctive power
narrowly. It has been interpreted to represent the power to seek tempo-
rary emergency relief only where normal enforcement procedures are too
slow or cumbersome to alleviate an immediate thrpat to workers."
judge, and can be appealed to the entire Commission. Decisions of the OSHRC, like uncontested
orders by OSHA, represent "final" administrative orders. 29 U.S.C. § 661 (1976 & Supp. 1980).
Decisions of the OSHRC can be appealed, by either the employer or OSHA, to the federal courts of
appeals. 29 U.S.C. § 660 (1976). Prosecutions for criminal violations are handled conventionally,
being referred by OSHA to the Department of Justice for prosecution in the federal district courts.
5. See 29 U.S.C. § 666(a)-(e) (1976). The various special citation provisions at 29 U.S.C. §
666(0-(h) (1976) are not addressed in this Note. These provisions prohibit such acts as giving advance
notice of inspections, filing false records, and making false statements to OSHA inspectors, but no
actions have ever been brought under most of these subsections. See Rothstein, OSHA After Ten
Years: A Review and Some Proposed Reforms, 34 VAND. L. REV. 71, 109 (1981).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 666(j) (1976).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1976).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 666(e) (1976).
9. Id. The available criminal penalties are doubled when an employer has previously been con-
victed, but no employer has ever been prosecuted more than once under the OSHAct.
10. 29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (1976).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 666(d) (1976).
12. OSHA FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL, ch. XI(C)(7)(e), reprinted in O.S.H. Rep. (BNA), Ref.
File 77:3704.
13. 29 U.S.C. § 662 (1976).
14. See supra note 4.
15. See infra p. 1461 & notes 75-77.
1447
The Yale Law Journal
II. Criminal Sanctions
The most spectacular failure of the OSHAct is that of the criminal
sanction. Congress apparently intended that the criminal sanction re-
present the big gun in OSHA's enforcement arsenal: a particularly potent
sanction reserved for the most egregious violations of the Act. 6 Through-
out their history, however, criminal penalties under the OSHAct have
been virtually inoperative. After reviewing the history, this Note examines
the potential of the criminal law, and concludes that the criminal law is
an inappropriate regulatory tool in the context of workplace safety and
health.
A. The Criminal Portion of the Act is Moribund
The use of the criminal sanction under the OSHAct has been all but
non-existent. Only twelve cases have been criminally prosecuted under the
Act since its inception. 17 They are distinguished by a marked lack of suc-
16. See, for example, the remarks of Senator Yarborough in floor debate on the alternative bills:
What about criminal penalties? The Williams-Yarborough bill provides for a penalty of
$10,000 and up to 6 months in jail for any willful violations of the standards. The Nixon
administration bill makes no such provisions .... We say penalize the man who willfully
violates the law.. . . A law without teeth is like a dull knife-it looks fine until you try to use
it for its intended purpose.
116 CONG. REC. 37,625-26 (1970).
While the legislative history on the purposes of the criminal penalty is sparse, strong inferences can
be drawn from its function and position in the Act. The invocation of criminal sanctions for a particu-
lar class of violations certainly connotes a heightened level of opprobrium, see, e.g., infra note 33, as
does a definition singling out "willful violations. . . that cause death to any employee." 29 U.S.C. §
666(e) (1976).
The legislative history of the OSHAct reveals that Congress considered, over a period of several
years, a variety of approaches to sanctions and remedies, which ranged from the entirely civil to the
entirely criminal. The bill that originally passed in the Senate invoked criminal penalties for all will-
ful violations of OSHA standards. S. 2193, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 14(c) (1970). The House bill
contained an entirely civil enforcement scheme. H.R. 19,200, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 17(a)-(d) (1970).
For a detailed examination of the many alternative bills considered by Congress, see Levin, OSHA
and the Sixth Amendment: When is a "Civil" Penalty Criminal in Effect? 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
1013, 1014-20 (1978); Sheahan, The Employer's Criminal Liability Under OSHA, 15 CRIM. L.
BuLL. 322, 323-26 (1979). See also Sullivan, Independent Adjudication and Occupational Safety and
Health Policy: A Test for Administrative Court Theory, 31 AD. L. REV. 177, 181-83 (1978) (discuss-
ing administrative structure of OSHRC and OSHA). The original Senate bill had the support of
organized labor, see Levin, supra, at 1017; while the House bill was favored by industry, see Sullivan,
supra, at 182.
17. United States v. Newton Roofing and Sheet Metal Co., Cr. No. 4-82-28 (N.D. Tex. June 25,
1982) (corporation fined $8000 after pleading guilty to willful violation involving fatal fall from un-
guarded skylight opening); United States v. Hughey Constr. Corp., Cr. No. 81-16D (W.D. Okla.
Feb. 27, 1982) (corporation fined $7500 on each of two counts after corporation and two officers
pleaded gulty to willful violation resulting in fatal trench cave-in); United States v. Youngstown Sheet
and Tube, Cr. No. H CR 82-14 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 18, 1982) (corporation fined $5000 after pleading
guilty to fatal willful violation involving motor vehicle); United States v. Jones, Cr. No. G-80-11
(S.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 1981) (corporation Farmers Export Co. not charged; hung jury resulted in ac-
quittal of both defendant individuals on thirty-six count indictment based on death of eighteen work-
ers in grain-elevator explosion); United States v. Port Allen Marine Services, Cr. No. 81-71A (M.D.
La. Oct. 26, 1981) (corporation fined $10,000 after pleading guilty to willful violation resulting in
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cess on the part of the prosecution, and by the imposition of minimal
sentences in the few cases in which guilty verdicts were obtained.
Incarceration is the threat that most markedly separates criminal penal-
ties available under the OSHAct from civil ones."s No one, however, has
ever been incarcerated for violations of the Act. In only two cases have
corporate officers been convicted as individuals, and those convictions fol-
lowed pleas of guilty or nolo contendere." In both cases, the convicted
officers were sentenced to probation." In the ten remaining cases, all cor-
drowning); United States v. Brown Steel Contractors, Cr. No. 80-G-254-S (N.D. Ala. Mar. 25, 1981)
(corporation fined $5000 after pleading nolo contendere to willful violation resulting in fatal fall);
United States v. Nichols Contracting Corp., Cr. No. 80-169A (N.D. Ga. Aug. 11, 1980) (corporation
fined $5000 after pleading nolo contendere to willful violation resulting in fatal trench cave-in);
United States v. S.O. Jennings Constr., Cr. No. 80-00098-A (E.D. Va. July 31, 1980) (corporation
granted motion for acquittal; fatal trench cave-in); United States v. Pinkston-Hollar, Inc., 4 O.S.H.
Cas. (BNA) 1697 (D. Kan. 1976) (corporation and officers acquitted after trial; fatal fall); United
States v. Crosby & Overton, No. CR-74-1832-F (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 1975) (corporation and two
officers pleaded nolo contendere to willful violation involving lethal fumes in closed tanks); United
States v. Dye Constr. Co., No. 73-CR-417 (D. Colo. Feb. 6,.1974), af'd, 510 F.2d 78 (10th Cir.
1975) (all counts against president dismissed; corporation convicted and fined $3500 for willful viola-
tion resulting in fatal fall); United States v. Turcon Co., Cr. No. 72-0-239 (D. Neb. Jan. 24, 1974)
(president acquitted by jury; corporation fined $5000 for willful violation).
The cases so singled out have had particularly compelling fact situations. For a detailed discussion
of the four earliest cases, see Levin, Crimes Against Employees: Substantive Criminal Sanctions
Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 717, 735-36 (1977). See also
infra note 20 (discussing United States v. Crosby & Overton).
18. It could also be argued that the "stigma" of criminal conviction separates OSHAct criminal
penalties from civil ones. But the near absence of convictions of individual corporate officers under-
mines the significance of such a stigmatic deterrent. See infra P. 1453 & note 39 (arguing that
"stigma" plays no distinctive or important role when applied to corporations).
19. United States v. Hughey Constr. Co., Cr. No. 81-16D (W.D. Okla. Feb. 27, 1982); United
States v. Crosby & Overton, No. CR-74-1832-F (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, f975). See supra note 17. While
the courts have generally accepted OSHA's position that corporate officers are liable as individuals for
charges relating to OSHAct violations, the issue remains somewhat clouded. Further confusion per-
sists, amidst very little case law, as to whether such liability arises directly under the OSHAct, or
under 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) for "aiding and abetting" the corporate violator. The confusion arises
from the fact that 29 U.S.C. § 666(e) (1976) limits liability to "any employer," but makes available
the sanction of incarceration. The conclusion that corporate officers are not individually liable would
presumably limit the use of incarceration to individuals managing unincorporated partnerships or
proprietorships, a seemingly bizarre result.
While the court in Crosby & Overton held corporate officers individually liable, it is not clear
whether officers in that case were convicted under 29 U.S.C. § 666(e) (1976) or 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
In United States v. Turcon Co., Cr. No. 72-0-239 (D. Neb. 1974), the court held that the corporate
president could be charged as an aider and abettor, but not as a violative employer. See Sheahan,
supra note 16, at 329-33. The only written opinion addressing the question is United States v. Pink-
ston-Hollar, Inc., 4 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1697 (D. Kan. 1976). The court rejected the corporate vice
president's claim that he could not be prosecuted under either 29 U.S.C. § 666(e) (1976) or 18 U.S.C.
§ 2 (1976), and held that the officer's status as an "employer" was a question of fact to be submitted
to the jury. 4 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) at 1699.
20. In United States v. Crosby & Overton, No. CR-74-1832-F (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 1975), the
corporation and two officers were charged with willfully failing to provide required safety equipment
to employees working in chemical tanks containing poisonous gas residues. See Levin, supra note 17,
at 736. The officers admitted to having been aware that the exhaust equipment was faulty, and to
having known that other companies in the industry had suffered fatalities under similar circum-
stances. The defendants had attempted to conceal evidence of the violation, and had committed the
same violation again after being arraigned. According to Levin, while the Justice Department re-
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porate officers were either not charged or were acquitted. The corporate
defendants were convicted in seven of those cases, five of them after enter-
ing pleas of guilty or nolo contendere.2' The five cases which have actually
gone to trial have produced one hung jury, two complete acquittals, and
two fines of $5000 and $3500 respectively. 2  This paucity of convictions
and of stiff penalties is not explained by a lack of criminally punishable
violations. Numerous cases of willful violations resulting in death are cited
by OSHA inspectors. Many such cases, however, are sanctioned civilly. 2
B. The Limitations of the Criminal Law
The failure of the criminal sanction under the OSHAct is unsurprising.
Historically, criminal convictions of corporations are slow, costly, and dif-
ficult to obtain; and of highly questionable usefulness even when achieved.
The failures of the criminal sanction under the OSHAct result not from
particular statutory flaws that could be remedied with some minor adjust-
ments, but from the fundamental inappropriateness of the criminal law as
a regulatory device in the occupational safety and health context.
1. Convictions are Difficult to Achieve
One key set of impediments to the successful prosecution of criminal
cases against corporations is the various procedural strictures associated
with the criminal law. Most notably these include the heavier burden of
proof. Stricter construction of the statute in the criminal context is also a
possibility, although the case law remains ambiguous. 2 4 While some legis-
quested strong exemplary sentences including jail terms, the court limited its sentence to four years of
probation for both the corporation and the convicted officers. Id.
21. See supra note 17.
22. See supra note 17.
23. See, e.g., Georgia Electric Co. v. OSHRC, 595 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1979) (following electrocu-
tion of worker, employer cited for willful violation of regulations regarding erection of light poles near
power lines); Cedar Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 587 F.2d 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (employer fined $4750
for willful violation following fatal trench cave-in; employer had been cited repeatedly for similar
violations); Secretary v. East Texas Steel Fabricators, 9 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1750 (OSHRC 1981)
(employer fined $3500 for willful violation following electrocution of employee working with crane
near power lines); Secretary v. J. Roy Wise, Inc., 8 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1691 (OSHRC 1980) (em-
ployer fined $5600 for willful violation following fatal trench cave-in; employer warned repeatedly on
day of accident that trench was inadequately sloped and dangerous). See also infra note 42.
24. Sheahan argues that the tension between the liberal construction to be accorded remedial leg-
islation and the strict construction appropriate to a criminal statute has played a role in judicial
interpretation of the OSHAct. He argues that the issue of whether a given employer "affects com-
merce," and is thus covered by the Act, has been more liberally construed in civil cases. Sheahan,
supra note 16, at 326-27.
Levin rejects the argument that the term "willfulness" is to be construed more strictly in the crimi-
nal context of § 666(e) than in the civil context of § 666(a). See Levin, supra note 17, at 723-30. But
see National Steel & Shipbuilding Co. v. OSHRC, 607 F.2d 311, 314-15 (9th Cir. 1979); Intercounty
Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 522 F.2d 777, 780 (4th Cir. 1975) ("willfulness is used in the mere cognitive
sense in civil statutes, and connotes bad purpose only when an element of a criminal act").
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lators recognized such problems at the time the OSHAct was passed,
others argued that the criminal sanction was neiertheless a necessary ele-
ment of a strong and effective enforcement mechanism.2" The subsequent
history of enforcement under the Act, however, belies such a contention.
The contrast of forums between criminal and civil OSHAct proceedings
adds to the elusiveness of convictions. Juries, even more than administra-
tive law judges or the OSHRC, are generally reluctant to convict corpora-
tions and their officers of crimes.26 A criminal trial also presents simple
mechanical problems for OSHA that are not present in civil cases. OSHA
lawyers must convince a United States Attorney that there is a case worth
bringing.27 The United States Attorney often must then obtain an indict-
ment, and go through a full-fledged criminal trial. Budget-strapped and
interested in cost-effectiveness, OSHA must discount the limited potential
gains from this investment of time and expense by the considerable un-
likelihood of a conviction. Almost invariably, the balance comes down
against criminal prosecution.
2. Criminal Convictions of Corporations are of Questionable Usefulness
The aims of the criminal law, and of sanctions in general, have been
characterized variously.28 For the purposes of discussion, those aims will
25. Senator Dominick made his concerns explicit:
[U]nder the provisions of the substitute, we have a civil not a criminal penalty for a willful or
repeated violation. That has been treated with some care. We did it this way because...
most of us know how difficult it is to get an enforceable criminal penalty in these types of
cases. Over and over again, the burden of proof under a criminal-type allegation is so strong
that you simply cannot get there, so you might as well have a civil penalty instead of the
criminal penalty and get the employer by the pocketbook if you cannot get him anywhere else.
116 CONG. REC. 37,338 (1970) (remarks in floor debate). Senator Yarborough, however, argued that
the Act would be greatly weakened without criminal penalties, see supra note 16. The House Labor
Committee also exhibited ambivalence over this dilemma: "American industry cannot be made safe by
enacting a Federal law which emphasizes punishment. Nevertheless, this measure recognizes that
iffective enforcement and sanctions are necessary for serious cases." H.R. REP. No. 1291, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 26 (1970) (report accompanying H.R. 16,785).
26. See, e.g., Comment, The Criminal Responsibility of Corporate Officials for Pollution of the
Environment, 37 ALB. L. REV. 61, 65-66 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Criminal Responsi-
bility]; Comment, Increasing Community Control Over Corporate Crime-A Problem in the Law of
Sanctions, 71 YALE L.J. 280, 292 n. 50 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Community Control].
Some writers have pointed out that this is generally less of a problem where the defendant is a
corporation, rather than a corporate officer. See infra note 52. The dismal history of prosecutions,
however, as well as the uniformly small sanctions that have been meted out, indicate that jury ambiva-
lence remains a problem.
27. Precise records of the number of cases referred by OSHA to the Justice Department have
been kept only for the last two years. Of the twenty-four cases referred for prosecution in that period,
the Justice Department has prosecuted seven. The screening function performed by the Justice De-
partment operates in addition to a similar role played by OSHA's national office, which sends to
Justice only about 60% of the cases referred from regional OSHA offices. Telephone interview with
Harold Engel, Counsel for Regional Trial Litigation at OSHA (March 11, 1982).
28. See, e.g., W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES 71-75 (7th ed.
1967); H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 35-61 (1968); Developments in the
Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L.
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be differentiated here into three broad categories: "punishment,"29 "gen-
eral deterrence,"30 and "specific rehabilitation."3' Among these three aims,
punishment is uniquely situated. The consequentialist goals of general de-
terrence and specific rehabilitation are common to both civil and criminal
enforcement.3 2 Punishment, on the other hand, is associated distinctively
with the criminal law, and is often tied closely to the issue of moral culpa-
bility." While some civil sanctions can unquestionably be every bit as
burdensome as criminal sanctions, attempts by the Supreme Court to dis-
cern whether a given penalty is effectively a criminal sanction have re-
peatedly focused upon the presence or absence of an intent to punish
moral culpability.
4
REV. 1227, 1231-33 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Developments in the Law]. Clark and Marshall
break the consequentialist goals of sanctioning into a much longer list than the one articulated here,
distinguishing such aims as prevention, education, retaliation, and the expression of indignation. Such
subtlety, however, is unnecessary for present purposes.
29. "Punishment," in the sense intended here, has been referred to by some authors as "retribu-
tion." See, e.g., H. PACKER, supra note 28, at 37-39. "Punishment" is used here to refer to the
imposition of penalties on the moral ground that the employer deserves to be sanctioned, as contrasted
with justifications based on the behavior-modifying consequences of sanctioning.
30. "General deterrence" is used here to refer to the behavioral effect on all employers of making
specific activities less profitable, or generally less attractive.
31. "Specific rehabilitation" as used here may represent either voluntary or coerced reform; it is
meant to refer to any attempt to shape prospectively the behavior of the specific defendant at bar. It
may also include the aim of incapacitation, which is represented in its classic form by incarceration,
but which can be effected upon a corporation through an injunction, administrative order, or even
dissolution.
32. In the context of corporate regulation, the power of the government to impose specific rehabil-
itation in the absence of criminal conviction is sweeping. For example, when the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) determines' that "any person has violated, is violating, or is about to vio-
late" the securities laws, the SEC is empowered to "publish information concerning such violations."
15 U.S.C. § 78u (1976). The SEC is also given the authority to petition the federal district courts for
"writs of mandamus, injunctions, and orders" commanding immediate and future compliance with the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is empowered to
issue broad cease-and-desist orders prohibiting unfair labor practices, and to require a violator to
"make reports from time to time showing the extent to which it has complied with the order." 29
U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976). Where a union is determined to have a "proclivity for harmful conduct," the
cease-and-desist order may bar "not only continued illegal conduct directed at the employer in the
case at bar, but also against any other employer in the union's jurisdiction." R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT
ON LABOR LAW UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 287 (1976). The Food and Drug Ad-
ministration is authorized to seize summarily goods suspected of being "adulterated or mislabelled."
21 U.S.C. § 334 (1976). Sellers of food and drugs are particularly sensitive to the negative publicity
which attends such a seizure.
33. See, e.g., Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404-05
(1958) ("What distinguishes a criminal conviction from a civil sanction and all that distinguishes it, it
is ventured, is the judgment of community condemnation which accompanies and justifies its imposi-
tion."); Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regula-
tions, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 440-44 (1963) (arguing that moral culpability is necessary to justify
"stigma of moral blame" associated uniquely with criminal sanctions).
34. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (sanction of expatriation against
draft evader held to be "evidently punitive," and to entitle defendant to Sixth Amendment protec-
tions). The criteria articulated by the Court in delineating congressional lattitude to prescribe civil
rather than criminal penalties include: "Whether the sanction. . . has historically been regarded as
punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, [and] whether its operation will
promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence." 372 U.S. at 168. See Trop
1452
OSHA
Portions of the legislative history, as well as the structure of the
OSHAct itself, indicate that punishment was a key legislative motive be-
hind the retention of a criminal sanction.35 As numerous authors have
noted, however, the aim of punishment in the context of corporate regula-
tion is problematic. 6 "Punishment" in any conceptually meaningful sense
cannot accurately be said to be applied to corporations. 7 However much
moral condemnation society may wish to express, virtually the only puni-
tive sanction that can be imposed on a corporation is the direct or indirect
limitation of profits. 8 Incarceration is obviously unavailable. Any
"stigma" associated with criminal penalties against a corporation is use-
ful, if at all, only as a roundabout means of affecting profits.3
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (civil sanction of expatriation for desertion from military during war-
time held to be explicable only as punishment, and hence impermissible).
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals applied these cases in holding that the sanctions under the
OSHAct are not sufficiently "punitive" to entitle the employer to Sixth Amendment protections. Atlas
Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 518 F.2d 990, 1000-11 (5th Cir. 1975), afl'don other grounds, 430 U.S. 442
(1977) (holding only that defendant had no Seventh Amendment right to jury trial).
For a general discussion of the criminal/civil distinction as it relates to the OSHAct, see Levin,
supra note 16.
35. The issue of punishment is a repeated theme throughout the Act's legislative history, although
references to it are often accompanied by the disclaimer that it cannot represent the only goal of the
OSHAct. See H.R. REP. No. 1291, supra note 25, at 26; see also supra note 16. On possible infer-
ences of a punitive motive behind criminal penalties, see Levin, supra note 16, at 1017-20.
36. See, e.g., Developments in the Law, supra note 28, at 1301-02; Comment, Criminal Responsi-
bility, supra note 26, at 62-64; Comment, Is Corporate Criminal Liability Really Necessary? 29 SW.
L.J. 908, 917-26 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Corporate Liability]; Comment, Community
Control, supra note 26, at 283-90.
37. In Developments in the Law, supra note 28, at 1237, the authors contend that "the argument
that retribution cannot be involved [in the imposition of criminal sanctions against corporations] is
unconvincing." This contention is based largely on the conclusion that violations of regulatory laws
under some circumstances are not morally neutral. The existence of some moral culpability, however,
does not require that the culpability be punished, nor that it serve as a basis for the imposition of
sanctions. A predictable counter-argument is that this is mere subterfuge, that whatever the claimed
intention behind sanctions, at least some violations of worker welfare are so outrageous as to make an
impulse to retribution, or even to vengeance, inevitable. Even granting this proposal, arguendo, it is
idle to engage in what must ultimately be a futile attempt to inflict "punishment" on an inanimate
corporation.
38. A rich range of sanctions has admittedly been applied against corporations at one time or
another. Corporations have been fined directly. They have been injunctively prohibited from certain
markets or operating practices. They have had their products seized, and been forced to recall their
products at immense cost. They have been required to engage in public advertising campaigns admit-
ting that they have misled the public. See Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (defendant required to correct prior advertising that its product, Listerine mouthwash, pre-
vented colds and sore throats). Indeed, they have even been placed on criminal probation pursuant to
the OSHAct. See United States v. Crosby & Overton, No. CR-74-1832-F (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 1975)
(discussed supra pp. 1449-50 & notes 19-20). In terms of "punishment," however, none of these
sanctions has been significant except insofar as it has affected corporate profits. See also infra note 39.
39. This stigma is not comparable to the stigma that criminal conviction visits upon an individual.
An individual has a wide range of needs and desires that are affected by the criminal stigma. Not only
his ability to earn a livelihood, but also his self-esteem, freedom of movement, and relationships with
peers and the community at large may all be affected. This is not the situation faced by a "stigma-
tized" corporation. The corporation may lose sales, or the trust of its employees, but ultimately the
corporation has no complex array of psychological and physical wants and needs analogous to those of
the individual. See, e.g., H. PACKER, supra note 28, at 360-62; Kadish, supra note 33, at 434-35;
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The failure of the criminal law to make a unique punitive contribution
to the sanctioning of OSHAct violators could be overlooked if criminal
enforcement made a significant addition to OSHA's deterrent capabilities.
No such addition, however, is attributable to the criminal sanction. The
criminal penalties currently available are extremely modest in comparison
to the expense of the actions they are supposed to encourage." They are
also radically discounted by the overwhelming unlikelihood of conviction.
Employers know that, unless they actually kill or maim a worker, their
chances of even being inspected by OSHA are quite remote.41 When a
death does occur, the employer's chance of being criminally prosecuted
and convicted remain extremely small.42 When thus discounted, only an
extraordinarily costly or unpleasant sanction can create a meaningful de-
terrent. Judges and juries in OSHAct trials, however, are disposed to
mete out penalties even smaller than those statutorily available,43 a ten-
dency confirmed in other regulatory contexts.44 The combination of that
pattern with the strictures on levels of inspection, prosecution, and convic-
tion, serve to insure that no meaningfully deterrent sanction can be relia-
bly provided by the criminal law.
3. Criminal Liability for Individuals
Although corporate officers have been convicted as individuals under the
OSHAct only twice,45 individual criminal liability for corporate officers is
Comment, Community Control, supra note 26, at 287-88.
40. See infra note 59.
41. For a discussion of the woeful inadequacy of OSHA's inspectorate, see Blumrosen, Ackerman,
Kligerman, VanSchaick, & Sheehy, Injunctions Against Occupational Hazards: The Right to Work
Under Safe Conditions, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 702, 715-16 (1976); Rothstein, supra note 5, at 94-95.
OSHA figures compiled by Rothstein indicate that the inspectorate would have to be more than qua-
drupled (from 1979 levels) to achieve what Eula Bingham, Assistant Secretary of Labor for OSHA in
the Carter Administration, estimates as a minimal level of inspection. That level is one inspection per
year of employers in high-risk industries, and one inspection per decade of employers in low-risk
industries. Even if inspections of low-risk industries under this scheme were abandoned entirely,
OSHA would need to more than triple its number of inspectors. Rothstein, supra note 5, at 94-95.
42. Figures are not available indicating how many deaths occur as a result of OSHAct violations
each year. Presumably, however, the worst cases are concentrated among the handful of cases referred
from OSHA Regional Offices to Washington for prosecution. Even among that highly skewed sample,
however, only a small percentage of the cases have resulted in conviction in the years that records have
been accurately kept. Of the forty-two cases referred from the Regional Offices since November 1979,
twenty-four were in turn referred to the Justice Deptartment for prosecution. Only six of those
twenty-four cases have resulted in convictions, see supra notes 17, 21; telephone interviews with Har-
old Engel, Counsel for Regional Trial Litigation at OSHA (March 11, 1982), and Julian S. Green-
spun, Deputy Chief of Litigation, General Litigation and Legal Advice Section, Criminal Division,
Department of Justice (June 28, 1982).
43. See supra pp. 1449-50 & notes 19-23.
44. See, e.g., Coffee, Corporate Cime and Punishment: A Non-Chicago View of the Economics
of Criminal Sanctions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 419, 456-57 (1980); Comment, Criminal Responsibil-
ity, supra note 26, at 64-66 (environmental pollution).
45. United States v. Hughey Constr. Co., Cr. No. 81-16D (W.D. Okla. Feb. 27, 1982); United
States v. Crosby & Overton, No. CR-74-1832-F (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 1975). See supra pp. 1449-50 &
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a common legislative choice . 6 It is also a favorite recommendation of
many writers attempting to circumvent the problems associated with cor-
porate criminal liability.47 The attractions of such liability generally in-
clude the hope of more genuine punishment, more effective deterrence,
and the opportunity to focus the sanction directly upon the culpable party.
An opposing body of literature, however, explores the myriad problems
associated with criminal liability for corporate officers.48 Those problems
generally relate to the difficulty of conviction and to concerns of fairness.4 9
In the context of OSHAct violations, the arguments of this latter group of
critics are more persuasive."0
Judges and juries are often reluctant to convict and incarcerate corpo-
rate officers.5" Cases are common, both generally and under the OSHAct
specifically, in which corporations are criminally convicted while corpo-
rate offiers are acquitted. 2 OSHAct criminal prosecutions have most of
notes 19-20.
46. See generally Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct,
90 YALE L.J. 1, 28-35 (1980) (discussing variety of theories of "agent liability" in a range of statutory
contexts, including antitrust, environmental pollution, bribery, and unfair labor practices).
47. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 44, at 458-62; Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation, 19 U.
PITT. L. REV. 21, 44-45 (1957); Developments in the Law, supra note 28, at 1373-74; Comment,
Corporate Liability, supra note 36, at 925-26. See also Whiting, Criminal Antitrust Liability of Cor-
porate Representatives, 51 KY. L.J. 434, 447 (1963) (addressing stigma attending mere indictment of
corporate officers, as well as assaults on dignity wrought by rituals accompanying arrest and prosecu-
tion); Comment, Community Control, supra note 26, at 298 (advocating "an affirmative duty on
corporate executives to exercise reasonable care in preventing acquisitive crime within the area of
corporate business under their control"); id. at 297-98, 301-05.
48. The problems of increased difficulty of conviction, ambiguous responsibility, and the possibil-
ity of the fined corporate officer being reimbursed by his employer are addressed repeatedly in the
literature. See, e.g., K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAW AND
ECONOMICS 43, 132-33 (1976); Stone, supra note 46, at 28-35; Comment, Criminal Responsibility,
supra note 26, at 64-75.
49. These problems are not entirely separate, as fairness concerns often play a key role in jury
reluctance to convict.
50. Coffee, an advocate of individual criminal liability, concedes that statutes like the OSHAct
present a special case:
[I]n the case of health and safety statutes which impose vicarious criminal liability on corpo-
rate officers . . . the odds are high that any campaign to invoke these laws will be substan-
tially offset by judicial nullification when sentencing judges confront 'flesh and blood' defen-
dants having impeccable backgrounds, community ties, and tearful families.
Coffee, supra note 44, at 462 (citing to OSHAct).
51. See, e.g., K. ELIZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note 48, at 43; Coffee, supra note 44, at 456-57;
Comment, Corporate Liability, supra note 36, at 922-24.
52. Seven of the nine OSHAct cases resulting in guilty verdicts fit this description. See supra pp.
1448-50 & notes 17-21. See also United States v. American Stevedores, 310 F.2d 47, 48-49 (2d Cir.
1962) ("[E]ven if the verdicts [of conviction for the corporation and acquittal for the corporate officer]
were inconsistent, it is well settled that consistency in these verdicts is not required."), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 969 (1963); United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376, 411 (7th Cir. 1941)
("We cannot understand how the jury could have acquitted all of the individual defendants. As a
matter of logic, reconciliation between the verdict of guilt and verdict of acquittal is impossible."). But
c. Pevely Dairy Co. v. United States, 178 F.2d 363, 370-71 (8th Cir. 1949) (presumption of correct-
ness of jury's verdict is undermined by conviction of corporate defendant and acquittal of all individ-
ual defendants). See generally Developments in the Law, supra note 28, at 1367-68 n.14; c. Gribetz
& Grad, Housing Code Enforcement Reviewed, 23 J. HOUSING 511, 513 (1966).
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the more telling characteristics that commentators have identified in at-
tempting to explain this phenomenon. Like most regulatory crimes,
OSHAct violations are usually committed by sympathetic defendants in
the course of their employment. 3 The relatively remote relationships be-
tween the OSHAct violator and his victim, and between the violative act
and the consequent injury or death, also presumably diminish the per-
ceived moral blameworthiness of the violation. A related phenomenon is
the problem of diffuse responsibility, and the fuzzy line between corporate
policy and individual action. 4 Attempting to fix criminal liability on the
low-level supervisory personnel who are often most directly responsible
for OSHAct violations carries overtones of scapegoating.55 Some authors
have suggested that the best way to avoid problems in affixing responsibil-
ity is to hold higher corporate officers to a duty of diligent supervision,56
or even to impose vicarious liability upon the highest corporate officer for
the actions of his subordinates. 7 This approach undeniably serves to focus
53. See Kadish, supra note 33, at 435-37 (regulatory crimes are committed by "respectable people
in the pursuit of profit," and thus fail to inspire "sustained public moral resentment"). Ball and
Friedman discuss the potential for jurors to sympathize more readily with a defendant who has com-
mitted a regulatory crime which, while admittedly illegal, is one the juror can imagine committing
himself in a bad moment. Ball & Friedman, The Use of Criminal Sanctions in the Enforcement of
Economic Legislation: A Sociological View, 17 STAN. L. REV. 197, 217-19 (1965). Ball and Friedman
contrast such acts with more traditional common crimes, which they argue appear to jurors as alien.
Sutherland, among others, viewed similar tendencies as naked favoritism, arguing that courts and
jurors generally accord businessmen lenient treatment as a result of their class standing. E. SUTHER-
LAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 46-49 (1949).
54. See Kadish, supra note 33, at 430-35 (discussing "problem of corporate criminality"); Note,
Structural Crime and Institutional Rehabilitation: A New Approach to Corporate Sentencing, 89
YALE L.J. 353, 357-60 (1979) (attributing to "organizational complexity and obscured individual
liability . . . what might be called 'structural crimes' ").
55. Dissatisfaction with the sanctioning of "direct actors" has been expressed often. See, e.g., I
UNITED STATES NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PA-
PERS 200-01 (1970) (acknowledging "general belief that many individual employees who violate...
regulatory statutes do so because they are under pressure, although not necessarily stated pressure,
from higher levels to increase profits in any way possible"); Developments in the Law, supra note 28,
at 1261 (citing both fairness and deterrence problems).
Arguments of scapegoating are particularly compelling under the OSHAct, where the individual
most directly responsible for the violation, and sometimes the only party who could be argued to have
acted "willfully," is often a site foreman or shopsteward. Criminal penalties directed at such lowly
employees are not only elusive, but also hardly seem calculated to affect corporate behavior.
56. See, e.g., S. 1630, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 403 (1982) (bill to reform United States Criminal
Code; "a person is criminally liable for an offense based upon conduct that he engages in or causes
. . . on behalf of an organization to the same extent as if he engaged in or caused the conduct. . . on
his own behalf"); Criminal Code Reform Bill, S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 403(c) (1978) (incorpo-
rating standard of reckless supervision); Developments in the Law, supra note 28, at 1270-75 (survey-
ing arguments and proposals for standards of "reckless supervision" and "negligent supervision");
Comment, Community Control, supra note 26, at 297-98, 302-05 (proposing imposition of "affirma-
tive duty on corporate executives to exercise reasonable care in preventing acquisitive crime within the
area of corporate business under their control").
57. Despite potential fairness problems, such vicarious liability has sometimes been imposed in
other regulatory contexts, and has been upheld by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., United States v.
Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943) (absolute vicarious liability imposed upon corporate president for
shipping adulterated and misbranded drugs); Carolene Prods. Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18
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liability for compliance upon a specific person. Having strayed so far from
the punishment of moral culpability, however, such an approach raises
questions of whether a legislature ought to pursue this purpose through
the criminal law. A direct administrative order accomplishes the same fo-
cusing of responsibility, but does so prospectively and with ample notice to
the responsible individual. Administrative orders also offer advantages in
ease and predictability of enforcement, which strengthen the incentives to
the identified corporate officer for assuring the compliance of his
subordinates.
Individual criminal liability, then, presents difficulties that make crimi-
nal convictions even more elusive than when pursued against the employer
corporation, and hence raises additional barriers to effective deterrence.
While the imposition of vicarious liability may serve to focus responsibil-
ity on individuals, it leaves the central drawbacks of criminal enforcement
untouched. In the absence of any distinctive contribution, the difficulties
that attend the use of the criminal law render its continued use under the
OSHAct difficult to justify.
III. Civil Enforcement
The deficiencies of the criminal law as a tool for enforcing OSHA stan-
dards need not undermine OSHA's entire enforcement panoply. Prudently
crafted civil sanctions and remedies could provide workable alternative
means of accomplishing the most important purposes of the criminal sanc-
tion. A credible threat of unusually severe civil sanctions for unusually
serious violations could serve as a highly useful deterrent device. Simi-
larly, sufficiently broad directive-order powers could enable OSHA to ef-
fect prospective rehabilitation. Unfortunately, OSHA's currrent civil pow-
ers offer no such promise. With civil powers too weak, narrow, and
inflexible to compensate for the vacuum left by the deficiencies of criminal
penalties, OSHA is left inadequately equipped to achieve its
responsibilities.
A. The Section 666 Civil Citation
Civil fines are immensely useful, and it is not contended here that they
should be eliminated from the OSHAct. For the vast run of lesser viola-
tions, the simple post-hoc civil fine represents the ideal quick and routine
tool. Such fines do have limitations, however, and these should be recog-
nized. Post-hoc civil fines lack the flexibility to serve as a useful prospec-
tive rehabilitative tool, and are limited in their deterrent capability.
(1944) (violations of Filled Milk Act of 1923); United States v. Andreadis, 366 F.2d 423 (2d Cir.
1966) (fraud in advertising drugs), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1001 (1967).
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The most obvious method for strenghtening the deterrent effect of civil
OSHAct fines is simply to make them larger. Critics of the Act have re-
peatedly called for increasing the size of fines available under the Act, and
the need for such a change is not disputed here."8 Arguments that the
Congress had no desire to impose upon industry the costs associated with
greater deterrence are not persuasive. The costs of compliance with
OSHA standards can be immense, sometimes running into the tens and
even hundreds of millions of dollars." The Supreme Court has neverthe-
less rejected employers' arguments that OSHA is required to engage in
cost-benefit analysis before promulgating standards."' The Court has ob-
1
58. See, e.g., R. SMITH, THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT: ITS GOALS AND ITS
ACHIEVEMENTS 63 (1976) (citing statistics on average fines actually imposed); Viscusi, The Impact of
Occupational Safety and Health Regulation, 10 BELL J. ECON. 117, 133-37 (1979) (statistical and
economic analysis of OSHAct fines, concluding that they are too small to spur significant health and
safety investment); Rothstein, supra note 5, at 108-10 (criticizing low enforcement and high settlement
rates, in addition to diminutive fines).
59. While self-interest undoubtedly serves to exaggerate industry claims as to the cost of compli-
ance with various standards, they are offered here as an approximate scale. OSHA estimated the cost
to the textile industry of compliance with its cotton dust standard at $656.5 million, see American
Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 525 n. 44 (1981), an estimate challenged by industry
petitioners as too low, id. at 523-26. In Secretary v. Continental Can Co., 4 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1541,
1544 (OSHRC 1976), a manufacturer of metal cans claimed that compliance with OSHA's noise
standard would require an initial investment by the defendant of $33,230,000, and an additional
$175,000 in yearly maintenance.
An interesting alternative perspective on these compliance costs is provided in M. BAILEY, REDUC-
ING RISKS TO LIFE 20-27 (1979). Bailey examines the "cost per human life saved" of compliance with
several regulatory standards, figures that are admittedly subject to considerable exaggeration by indus-
try. He reports testimony by a representative of the Council on Wage and Price Stability to OSHA in
1976 that this cost-per-life-saved figure under OSHA's coke oven emission standard varied from $4.5
million to $158 million. Similar testimony to OSHA by an industry representative in 1978 offered the
rather inexact calculation that the analogous figure for compliance with OSHA's acrylonitrile expo-
sure standard varied between $1,963,000 and $624,976,000.
60. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981). The debate over OSHA's
mandate centers on section 655(b)(5) of the OSHAct, which states:
The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful physical
agents under this subsection, shall set the standard which most adequately assures, to the
extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer mate-
rial impairment of health or functional capacity even if such employee has regular exposure to
the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period of his working life.
29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976) (emphasis added). OSHA has stringently construed this feasibility limi-
tation. Defining "economic feasibility," OSHA has declared:
The employer's economic cost of correction is generally not considered to be a factor in the
issuance of a citation.
* . . However, if the cost of implementing effective engineering, administrative or work
practice controls, or combination, would so seriously jeopardize the employer's financial condi-
tion so as to result in the probable shutdown of the establishment or a substantial part of it, an
extended correction date may be set.
OSHA INDUSTRIAL HYGIENE MANUAL ch. I (I)(4)(b), reprinted in O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) Ref. File
77:8007. In American Textile Mfrs., the Supreme Court explicitly upheld OSHA's claim that OSHA
was not required to weigh costs against benefits in promulgating standards. 452 U.S. at 506-22.
For a detailed examination of the lower court case law on "feasibility," see Berger & Riskin,
Economic and Technological Feasibility in Regulating Toxic Substances Under the Occupational
Safety and Health Act, 7 ECOL. L.Q. 285, 324-26 (1978). Discussing the distinction between "techno-
logical" and "economic" feasibility, Berger and Riskin conclude:
[I]n enforcing feasible requirements, the Secretary may require an employer to go beyond the
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served that, "Congress understood that the Act would create substantial
costs for employers, yet intended to impose such costs when necessary to
create a safe and healthful working environment."'" Fines of at most
$10,000 are hardly adequate, as deterrent or coercive devices, to effect so
sweeping a mandate.
62
Even if fines were dramatically increased, however, they are not suited
to carry the entire burden of enforcement. Post-hoc fines, no matter how
large, perform a predominantly deterrent, rather than coercive function.
They serve to deter violations generally, but not to insure that any partic-
ular employer implements specific reforms. OSHA could theoretically be
empowered to increase fines progressively against a recalcitrant employer
until adequate compliance is finally achieved. Given the staggering costs
associated with some health and safety measures, however, the size of such
fines would have to be exceedingly large.63 The advisability of such an
approach is further mitigated by the low levels of inspection and enforce-
ment under the OSHAct, as well as the considerable delays associated
with each round of citation and contest. The administrative order provides
a markedly superior device for coercing the particularly non-compliant
employer, or for assuring the adoption of particularly expensive
safeguards.
64
B. Abatement Orders and Imminent-Danger Injunctive Powers
In addition to the simple post-hoc citation, OSHA's civil arsenal in-
cludes the agency's "abatement order" power. OSHA is empowered to
order employers to correct, or "abate," ongoing violations," and to enforce
state of the actual technology in his industry. Not only may compliance be expensive, but an
employer may be forced out of business through promulgated regulations. Such an approach
regards safety and health compliance as a cost of doing business, and implicitly rejects individ-
ual employer defenses that compliance is not required if compliance costs exceed the economic
benefit gained through improved safety and health.
Id. at 325-26 (citations omitted). See also Sullivan, supra note 16, at 184-94 (focusing on deference of
OSHRC to OSHA's definition of "feasible"); Note, Occupational Noise: A Watershed Issue for
OSHA, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 667, 669-73 (1978) (examining meaning of "feasible" when used
within specific standard).
61. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 519-20 (1981).
62. One possible rebuttal is that OSHAct fines are not the only deterrent to violative behavior.
But worker compensation claims, and consequently employer insurance premiums, radically under-
represent the true "cost" of workplace injuries. Employers generally pay only medical expenses and
lost wages, rather than full tortious damages. See generally Miller, The Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970 and the Law of Torts, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 612, 628-30 (1974).
63. Massive civil fines in this context are also distinctly unattractive. Regardless of the absolutist
language of the OSHAct, costs associated with occupational safety and health protection are a contin-
ual political concern. Huge civil fines would take money directly away from corporate violators hence
increasing the cost of the OSHAct to industry while doing nothing to benefit workers directly.
64. See infra pp. 1469-70 & notes 109-20.
65. 29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (1976).
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such orders with fines"6 and possible contempt proceedings. 7 This abate-
ment power broadens OSHA's authority beyond mere deterrence, by ad-
ding a device for pursuing the prospective rehabilitation of specific em-
ployers. As such, it is directed toward goals similar to those proposed in
this Note. Under the Act as it is currently structured, however, those goals
are realized only marginally.
Citations for "failure to abate" create virtually no deterrence. Until an
employer has actually been inspected and cited for non-compliance with
OSHA standards, an abatement citation is not a possibility. The employer
that takes no action to abate a violation until after it is cited can be fined
only for violating the OSHA standard, not for violating an abatement or-
der, so the threat of an abatement order creates no incentive for self-en-
forced pre-inspection compliance. The abatement order itself is also un-
necessarily limited in scope. While OSHA can establish a method and
timetable for compliance, it does not have the power to impose individual-
ized oversight or safety programs beyond those that are necessary for bare
compliance.6 Thus, even where the employer has proven to be a recalci-
trant or habitual violator, OSHA has virtually no power to pursue the
kind of broad prospective rehabilitation advocated in this Note.69
Other limitations of the abatement power affect its range of application
and its coercive effectiveness. OSHA can cite an employer for failure to
comply with an abatement order only by proving that a condition as rein-
spected is identical to the condition upon first inspection and that the vio-
lation has been continuously uncorrected.70 Thus, even an employer that is
cited, corrects a violation, and then later returns to a condition of non-
66. 29 U.S.C. § 666(d) (1976).
67. Under 29 U.S.C. 660(b) (1976), OSHA may seek a decree from a federal court of appeals to
enforce abatement orders. Violation of that decree constitutes contempt of court.
68. The precise contours of OSHA's abatement-order powers are not clear, nor have they been
ambitiously litigated. In Marshall v. Sullenberger, No. 80-2232 (3rd Cir. June 9, 1981), OSHA
attempted to have a decree enforcing an abatement order entered against the purchasers of a corpora-
tion that had been in.repeated and unabated non-compliance for over two years. In attempting to
reach the purchasers, OSHA argued that its powers should be construed to encompass the authority to
take such affirmative action as is necessary to effectuate the policies of the OSHAct. Brief for Secre-
tary of Labor, id., at 7-8. These arguments were based in part on Golden State Bottling Co. v.
NLRB, 414 U.S. 168 (1973), in which the Supreme Court held that the NLRB does possess such
powers. Without expressly addressing this issue, however, the Third Circuit denied OSHA's motion
for enforcement against the purchasers.
OSHA met with greater success in Brennan v. Tomeo Stud Co., No. 74-1947 (7th Cir. March 21,
1975). Without elaboration, the court in that case granted OSHA's motion for a cease-and-desist
order prohibiting future violations by the employer "in any like or related manner." Such judicial
activism on behalf of OSHA, however, may be unique. See Brief for Secretary of Labor, Marshall v.
Sullenberger, supra, at 14-15 (citing Tomco Stud).
69. See infra p. 1470.
70. OSHA FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL ch. VIII(B)(5)(c), reprinted in O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) Ref.
File 77:3108. See also M. ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW § 306, at 312-13
(1978 & Supp. 1982).
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compliance cannot be cited for failure to abate.7 1 This constricted defini-
tion excludes those violators engaged in the repeated violation of a single
standard, as well as those engaged in repeated or habitual violation of a
variety of standards. As a coercive device, the abatement power also suf-
fers from the same problem as the standard civil citation: it is too small to
effect incentives commensurate with the purposes of the Act. Abatement
orders are backed up by the threat of an assessed penalty of no more than
$1000 per day for non-compliance.72 The coercive effect of these fines is
further limited by lengthy time-lapses before abatement orders take effect,
as well as by OSHA's policy of limiting fines for failure to comply with
abatement orders to ten times the daily assessed penalty."
OSHA retains in its arsenal one final civil enforcement tool: the power
to seek temporary restraining orders or emergency injunctions where an
"immediate" or "imminent" threat to workers "exists which could reason-
ably be expected to cause death or serious physical harm." Confusion
surrounds several key aspects of that power. In general, however, it has
been interpreted by the courts to be quite limited. It is clear that these
section 662 powers can be used as an interlocutory device to insure relief
"pending the outcome of an enforcement proceeding,"" but the courts
have generally been reluctant to construe OSHA's power to encompass
the authority to seek permanent injunctions.76 The language of section 662
has also been read to restrict OSHA's power to seek injunctions to those
situations in which other enforcement tools appear too cumbersome to ef-
fect immediate relief. 77 Finally, the various procedural safeguards that
71. See, e.g., Secretary v. Montgomery AMC Drilling, Ltd., 5 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1629, 1630
(OSHRC 1977).
72. 29 U.S.C. § 666(d) (1976).
73. See OSHA FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL ch. XI(C)(7)(e), reprinted in O.S.H. Rep. (BNA)
Ref. File 77:3704. This ten-day limitation is apparently based in part on the fact that OSHA's man-
power problems can produce considerable time lags between original and subsequent inspections; dur-
ing this time the employer may remain in violation. Although it happens rarely in practice, this ten-
day limit can be waived in egregious circumstances. Id. For example, OSHA has embarked on a
campaign to waive the limitation when sanctioning violators of its coke-oven emissions standard. 10
O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 461 (1980). Battles over the agency's attempts to enforce that standard have been
taking place for years, as has continued widespread industry non-compliance.
74. 29 U.S.C. § 662 (1976).
75. 29 U.S.C. § 662(b) (1976). See, e.g., Secretary v. Dye Constr. Co., 1971-1973 OSHD (CCH)
115,720 (D.Colo. Mar. 23, 1973) (granting TRO); Secretary v. C. N. Flagg & Co., No. 15,268 (D.
Conn. Sept. 14, 1972) (granting TRO and preliminary injunction); Secretary v. Greenfield & Assoc.,
1 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1015 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 5, 1972) (granting TRO and preliminary injunction).
76. One exception is Secretary v. A.G. Pinkston Co., 1971-1973 OSHD (CCH) 1 15,498 (E.D.
Va. Dec. 20, 1972) (granting permanent injunction against trench-shoring violations at particular
jobsite; no mention made of apparent interlocutory limitations of injunctions under 29 U.S.C. §
662(b) (1976)).
77. See, e.g., Brennan v. OSHRC and Kesler & Sons Constr. Co., 513 F.2d 553 (10th Cir. 1975):
Section 662 provides that under certain circumstances United States district courts may re-
strain employment conditions or practices which create such an imminent danger . . . that
such danger could not be eliminated through the Act's other enforcement procedures. This
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surround the injunctive power often render it no more immediately useful
than the enforcement procedures it was meant to shortcut." Unsurpris-
ingly, the injunctive power has been invoked by OSHA only rarely, and
with limited usefulness.79
IV. The Criteria by Which Violations are Categorized
An evaluation of the effectiveness of OSHAct sanctions and remedies
cannot focus solely on an examination of the maximum penalties availa-
ble. The Act is pervaded by a relatively complex collection of criteria
which determine how violations are categorized and sanctioned. The
OSHAct not only provides OSHA with an inadequate range of adminis-
trative sanctions, but also stresses the wrong priorities in singling out par-
ticular violations as targets for extraordinary sanctions. The criteria fo-
cused upon here are the "willfulness" test of sections 666(a) and 666(e),
the "repeated violation" standard of section 666(a), and the lethality test
of section 666(e).
Several aspects of the OSHAct make these three criteria extremely im-
portant. As described, the sanctions available for violations outside of the
three most seriously sanctioned categories are almost negligible. If a viola-
tion is not held to be "willful" or "repeated," the fine imposed cannot
exceed $1000;"0 if a willful violation does not result in the death of an
employee, no criminal liability or attendant threat of incarceration
particular section, in our view, is designed to meet the situation in which, for example, imme-
diate abatement is ordered, and the employer contests the citation. Then, if the danger be great
and imminent, the Secretary may invoke the provisions of § 662 and go to court in an effort to
get immediate corrective action.
Id. at 558; see also Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1980) ("By means of a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction, the court may. . . require the employer to avoid, correct,
or remove the danger. . §662(a). Such an order may continue pending the consummation of the
Act's normal enforcement proceedings. § 662(b)." Id. at 9.)
A close reading of the language of the Act supports this narrow construction. See M. ROTHSTEIN,
supra note 70, § 308 (noting that TRO's are limited to five days under § 662(b), rather than custom-
ary ten); Dellapenna, Emergency Injunctions Under OSHA, 8 ENVT'L. L. 723, 742-43 (1978); see
also 116 CONG. REC. 37,338 (1970) (remarks of Senator Dominick); 116 CONG. REC. 37,624 (1970)
(remarks of Senator Javits).
78. See Dellapenna, supra note 77, at 742-48. Only the Secretary of Labor is empowered to seek
imminent-danger injunctions; employers and their unions are not. The Secretary's power is also un-
dercut by the requirement that he seek an injunction in federal court, rather than simply by issuing an
administrative order. But see id. at 744-46 (workers may be entitled to walk off the job without
reprisals in "emergency situations"). See also Marshall v. Daniel Constr. Co., 563 F.2d 707, 713-15
(5th Cir. 1977) (exploring the scope of OSHA's emergency remedial powers).
79. Rothstein reports that as of 1977, injunctions had been sought only nine times. Relief was
granted in four of those cases, and denied in one; the other four cases resulted in consent agreements.
M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 70, § 308, at 319-20 (no additional injunctions reported in 1982 pocket
part).




arises.' In addition, OSHA's chronically strained enforcement budget
prevents the agency from imposing costly sanctions upon more than a
small number of employers.8 2 Costly sanctions are far more likely to be
legally contested than are smaller ones, and are more expensive for OSHA
to impose." The group of violations singled out for higher sanctions
should thus be carefully drawn, and should not be unnecessarily large.
A. The Willfulness Standard
The present structure of the Act places paramount importance upon the
issue of whether a violation has been committed "willfully." This determi-
nation serves as a threshold test for the most seriously sanctioned class of
civil OSHAct violations, and for all criminal violations. While the factors
currently taken to comprise "willfulness" are not irrelevant to the deter-
mination of how severely a violation should be sanctioned, elevating cor-
porate "willfulness" to its present central position has several undesirable
consequences.
The first problem with the willfulness standard is that it focuses litiga-
tion on the convoluted issue of corporate state of mind. Establishing that a
corporation has acted "willfully" saddles OSHA with what can be a high-
ly problematic and expensive proof burden, especially under the standard
for criminal convictions.14 Corporate willfulness is imputed from the acts
and apparent knowledge of supervisory employees, and inferred through
such evidentiary proxies as a history of prior citations and the length of
time a violation has continued uncorrected.
The OSHRC, however, is already authorized to consider a variety of
factors in determining appropriate penalties. These include "the gravity of
81. See 29 U.S.C. § 666(e) (1976).
82. On OSHA's overwhelming caseload backlog, see Rothstein, supra note 5, at 115-18. On inad-
equate inspection levels, see supra note 41.
83. Violations involving high penalties and high abatement costs are far more likely to be ap-
pealed than are other citations. See Rothstein, Judicial Review of Decisions of the Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission-1973-1978: An Empirical Study, 56 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
607, 610-14 (1980) (empirical examination of the nature and outcome of OSHAct cases before the
OSHRC and federal courts of appeals).
84. Numerous cases attest to the burden imposed on OSHA in establishing "willfulness." See,
e.g., Secretary v. Favrot-Bellows, Inc., 6 0.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1531 (OSHRC 1978) (where failure to
install guardrails or issue safety belts to workers on 11th floor scaffolding resulted in fatal fall, fore-
seeability of the danger held to qualify the violation as "serious" but not "willful;" penalty reduced
from $10,000 to $500); Secretary v. Dye Constr. Co., 4 0.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1444 (OSHRC 1976)
(insufficient evidence to establish willfulness, despite employer's previous conviction for fatal criminal
violation of same standard, see supra note 17).
On confusion in the federal courts surrounding the construction of "willfulness," see infra note 88.
In particular, OSHA continues to be reversed in the Third Circuit on willful violations, due to that
court's distinctively stringent definition of willfulness. See Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. OSHRC, 622
F.2d 1160, 1165 (3rd Cir. 1980) (violations held not "willful" because not caused by "deliberate or
intentional disregard of the statute").
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the violation, the good faith of the employer, and the history of previous
violations."85 On judicial review, the OSHRO's determinations on these
matters are conclusive so long as they are "supported by substantial evi-
dence.186 Were the various proxies which are currently bundled into a
single legal burden of "willfulness" instead left to the administrative judg-
ments of OSHA and the OSHRC, a time-consuming and expensive issue
would be removed from OSHAct trials.
87
A further problem with the OSHAct's use of the "willfulness" standard
is that it focuses not on the injury sustained by the worker, but on the
employer's "state of mind" and moral culpability.8 The limited usefulness
of the concepts of corporate scienter and moral culpability, discussed above
in reference to the use of the criminal sanction,89 persists whether a will-
fulness standard is employed in a criminal or a putatively civil sanction. 0
Admittedly, the sanctioning of moral culpability was not Congress' sole,
nor even overriding, purpose in drafting the OSHAct. 91 Insofar as the Act
85. 29 U.S.C. § 666(i) (1976).
86. 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1976). See, e.g., Long Mfg. Co., N.C. v. OSHRC, 554 F.2d 903 (8th
Cir. 1977):
As to the amount of the penalty assessed, we have recognized that a determination of how
large or how small a penalty should be imposed is not a finding of fact but is an exercise of
discretion by the Commission which will not be disturbed by us in the absence of abuse.
Id. at 908 (citations omitted).
87. Given the paramount significance currently attached to willfulness, procedural changes so dra-
matically lowering OSHA's proof burden might seem startling. Under the proposals put forth in the
final section of this Note, however, "willfulness" would hold no such position of centrality.
88. The degree of bad faith necessary to constitute "willfulness" under the OSHAct, and under
corporate regulatory acts in general, is open to debate. See Sheahan, supra note 16, at 333-39. The
Third Circuit has applied a relatively stringent construction:
Willfulness connotes defiance or such reckless disregard of consequences as to be equivalent to
a knowing, conscious, and deliberate flaunting of the Act. Willfulness means more than merely
voluntary action or omission-it involves an element of obstinate refusal to comply.
Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. OSHRC, 519 F.2d 1200, 1207 (3rd Cir. 1974), afl'd, 519 F.2d 1215, 1219
(3rd Cir. 1975) (en banc), afl'd on other grounds sub nor. Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 430 U.S.
442 (1977). A more typical construction is found in the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Intercounty Con-
str. Co. v. OSHRC, 522 F.2d 777, 779-80 (4th Cir. 1975) (" '[W]illful' means action taken knowl-
edgeably by one subject to the statutory provisions in disregard of the action's legality. No showing of
malicious intent is necessary."), cut. denied, 423 U.S. 1072 (1976). But see Cedar Constr. Co. v.
OSHRC, 587 F.2d 1303, 1305 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("While there may be a difference in emphasis in
the Third Circuit's approach, we do not see that it rises to the level of a 'conflict' among the Circuits.
89. See supra p. 1453.
90. The use of civil sanctions to punish morally culpable behavior also renders OSHAct sanctions
vulnerable to attack for being, in effect, criminal sanctions. See Levin, supra note 16. Levin focuses on
the unsuccessful constitutional challenges brought against civil OSHAct sanctions in Frank Irey, Jr.,
Inc. v. OSHRC, 519 F.2d 1200 (3rd Cir. 1974), afi'd, 519 F.2d 1215 (3rd Cir. 1975) (en banc), afl'd
on other grounds sub nom. Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 430 U.S. 442 (1977); and in Atlas Roofing
Co. v. OSHRC, 518 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1975) (applying factors articulated in Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), supra note 34), atfd on other grounds, 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
91. This conclusion can be drawn from the reliance of the Act on an overwhelmingly civil en-
forcement scheme, as well as the ambit of the Act as a whole. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5177, 5177-81. The Senate Report de-
scribes the general reduction of workplace injuries and illnesses as the Act's central purpose: "The bill
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is primarily intended to protect the safety and health of workers, however,
violations should be categorized according to criteria more directly related
to the benefit of workers, such as either the actual infliction of any in-
jury,9, or an employer history of recidivism.
B. The Repeated Violation Standard
In establishing the most strongly sanctioned category of civil violations,
section 666(a) encompasses not only "willful" violations, but also "re-
peated" violations.3 The repeated violation standard might seem to ad-
dress employer recidivism generally.94 The standard contains limitations,
however, which render it inapt as a device for identifying and sanctioning
recidivists.
First, the test is not satisfied by a general pattern of repeated violation,
but encompasses only repeated violations of a particular OSHA standard.
The OSHRC and the courts also have read the test to require that, in
order to be categorized as "repeated," violations must be committed under
substantially similar circumstances. 9 These requirements are based
largely on a view that the test is meant to single out employers that have
would achieve its purpose through programs of research, education and training, and through the
development and administration. . . of uniformly applied occupational safety and health standards."
Id. at 5177. The Senate Report then reviews the toll exacted nationally by workplace injuries and
illnesses, and the role that occupational safety and health legislation can and reportedly has played in
spurring workplace protection.
In submitting the Conference Committee Report on the floor of the House, Rep. Daniels remarked:
[I]n conference it was resolved that the only criminal penalties would be for a willful viola-
tion . . . resulting in the death of an employee.
The conference report presented to this body today emphasizes the preventative rather than
the punitive aspect of job safety regulation.. . . [T]he legislation includes excellent provisions
for research into health hazards, for monitoring pollutant levels, [and] for a national institute
for occupational safety and health .
116 CONG. REC. 42,203 (1970).
See also Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 518 F.2d 990, 1010-11 (5th Cir. 1975), afl'd, 430 U.S. 442
(1977) (holding that courts must defer to Congress' characterization of Act's purposes as "remedial,"
barring convincing contrary evidence).
92. Smith has suggested abolishing the OSHAct's approach of mandatory safety standards in
favor of an "injury tax." He concedes, however, that the approach is not helpful in the enforcement of
workplace health standards. He also seems to ignore the incentives such a system would create for
employers to suppress information about the occurrence of accidents. See R. SMITH, supra note 58,
78-83; Smith, The Feasibility of an "Injury Tax" Approach to Occupational Safety, 38 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 730 (1974) (economic analysis concluding that tax would have to be very large to have
even moderate effect).
93. 29 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1976) (subjects employers that "willfully or repeatedly" commit viola-
tions to $10,000 civil liability).
94. See infra pp. 1469-70.
95. See, e.g., Secretary v. Potlatch Corp., 7 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1061, 1062-64 (OSHRC 1978)
(acknowledging diverse constructions of "repeated violation" and promulgating definitional "princi-
ples"); Secretary v. Smith Masonry Contractors, 6 Q.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1271, 1273 (OSHRC 1978)
(upholding administrative law judge's finding of "repeated" violation, but with leave to allow em-
ployer to show violations occurred under different supervisors). For a general discussion of the various
strictures surrounding the definition of a repeated violation, see M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 70, § 304.
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been placed on notice, by a previous citation, that a specific condition is to
be eradicated. Indeed, some courts have gone so far as to infer, from the
common treatment in section 666(a) of "willful or repeated violations,"
that the "repeated" test is meant to include an implied state-of-mind re-
quirement akin to willfulness.96
The "repeated" standard, so far as it goes, is a useful one. It does not,
however, represent a general recidivism standard. The various limitations
placed on it retain overtones of moral culpability, i.e. of singling out em-
ployers that have violated standards intentionally or in deliberate disre-
gard of their OSHA duties. A more generalized recidivism standard could
dispense with the state-of-mind emphasis, and focus on a history of re-
peated violation simply as an indicator that an employer is not responding
to OSHAct deterrents, and is likely to commit additional violations in the
future.
It should also be noted that while the current standard does subject
repeat violators to higher penalties, it does so only in the form of larger
post-hoc fines. Where the employer's previous violations have been "will-
ful," the situation is even worse, since the "repeated" label then triggers
no increased liability whatever.97 Given that the population of repeat vio-
lators is by definition resistent to normal OSHAct deterrents, and given
the extremely low inspection rates realized by OSHA," this continued ex-
clusive use of simple post-hoc fines is hardly calculated to enhance compli-
ance. At no point, however, does a repeated violation trigger the obvious
remedial response: emphasis on legally coerced specific rehabilitation.9
96. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, for example, has stood steadfastly by its con-
struction of "repeated," articulated at length in Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. OSHRC, 540 F.2d 157,
160-62 (3rd Cir. 1976); see, e.g., Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Marshall, 636 F.2d 32, 33 (3rd
Cir. 1980):
In Bethlehem Steel we declared that two violations of a safety standard could not form the
basis of a citation for a "repeated" violation; rather, we held that several instances indicating a
flouting of OSHA standards were necessary to establish a predicate for a finding of repeated
violations.
Id. at 33. The OSHRC has also been attracted, at times, to a state-of-mind requirement for repeated
violations; see, e.g., Secretary v. George Hyman Constr. Co., 5 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1318 (OHSRC
1977) (three-way split among the three commissioners in defining "repeatedly," so no official action
taken). OSHA, on the other hand, takes the position that there is no state-of-mind element to a
repeated violation; see OSHA FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL, Ch. VIII(B)(5)(b), reprinted in O.S.H.
Rep. (BNA), Ref. File 77:3108 ("Repeated violations differ from willful violations in that they may
result from an inadvertent, accidental or ordinarily negligent act." (emphasis in original)). For a more
detailed discussion, see M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 70, §304 at 305-07 & Supp. 1982.
97. Repeated willful violations are subject to no greater liability under 29 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1976)
than isolated willful violations, although the OSHRC may in its discretion consider the history of
previous citations in setting fines. 29 U.S.C. § 666(i) (1976).
98. See supra note 41.
99. See, e.g., infra p. 1470.
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C. The Lethality Standard
Like the other OSHAct criteria, the requirement that a violation have a
fatal consequence in order to be categorized as criminal has several unto-
ward effects."'0 The most significant consequences of the lethality test are
manifested in the context of "health," as opposed to "safety," violations. 10 1
The lethality test fails to encompass virtually any health violations. Wide-
spread exposure of workers to particulate and chemical emissions is cer-
tainly one of the most serious threats to worker life and health, and was
recognized as such by the drafters of the Act. 02 Proving a direct chain of
causation between such exposure and any particular death, however, is
nearly impossible for most emissions. 103 The necessity of proving such cau-
sation to the satisfaction of the criminal burden of proof is virtually insur-
mountable. Furthermore, some workplace toxins commonly induce such
maladies as sterility, paralysis, or fetal deformities, while only rarely caus-
ing the death of a worker."0 4 Other toxins, while ultimately lethal, have
100. In pertinent part, 29 U.S.C. § 666(e) (1976) reads:
Any employer who willfully violates any standard, rule, or order, . . . and that violation
caused death to any employee, shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than
$10,000 or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by both....
(emphasis supplied).
101. "Health" violations are defined in S. REP. NO. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5177, 5177-79. Health violations are defined as those leading to the
possibility of occupational diseases such as "cancer, respiratory ailments, allergies, heart disease, and
others." Id. at 5178. Usually they are associated with exposure to toxic substances, but they also
include "harmful physical agents, such as severe noise or vibration." Id. at 5179.
102. See S. REP. NO. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5177, 5178-81.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that 4950 workers (at establishments with more than ten
workers) suffered work-related death in 1979. Presumably because of causative uncertainty, however,
the Bureau's statistics virtually ignore occupational diseases as a cause of death. The business of
estimating the number of deaths caused annually by occupational disease is extremely unreliable. A
survey of various estimates is contained in P. BARTH & H. HUNT, WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND
WORK-RELATED ILLNESSES AND DISEASES 15-27 (1980). According to Barth and Hunt, the most
publicized figure is the estimate of 100,000 deaths per year contained in the PRESIDENT'S REPORT ON
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH (1972), but some estimates range as low as 10,000 deaths per
year.
The Carter administration was strongly committed to shifting OSHA's enforcement priorities to-
ward occupational health concerns. According to Berger and Riskin, supra note 60, Dr. Eula Bing-
ham, Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health in the Carter administration,
"was selected for the post largely because of her professional concentration in occupational cancer and
other diseases." Id. at 286 n.6. Heavy emphasis was also placed on increasing the number and train-
ing of occupational health inspectors. Id. at 285-86.
103. The limits of current scientific understanding of carcinogenesis is one factor, as is the hostil-
ity of the courts to statistical evidence of the probability that a specific cancer was caused by a particu-
lar exposure. See Note, Tort Actions for Cancer Deterrence, Compensation, and Environmental Car-
cinogenesis, 90 YALE L.J. 840, 847-855 (1981).
104. It might be argued that however poignant these health effects may be, they are less signifi-
cant than fatalities. While such an argument may be reasonable in a sense, it hardly justifies the Act's
failure to recognize such health effects as significant. Under the Act, even repeated exposure of work-
ers to such maladies subjects the employer only to $10,000 civil liability under 29 U.S.C. § 666(a)
(1976).
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latency periods of up to forty years, periods far in excess of the statute of
limitations for OSHAct violations.'10 Under the lethality test, employers
illegally exposing workers to such substances are assured of never being
charged criminally under the OSHAct for such violations.
An additional problem with the lethality test derives from the fact that
it hinges criminality on the occurrence of a result, rather than merely on
the commission of a violation. Any employer exposing its workers to a
substantial chance of death is by definition guilty of a "serious viola-
tion."'0 6 The imposition of enhanced liability on those employers that ac-
tually kill workers is presumably justified as additionally deterring all em-
ployers from life-endangering behavior.' 7 As described above, however,
being sanctioned criminally is an exceedingly unlikely prospect even if a
violation does have fatal consequences.' 8 A profit-maximizing employer
contemplating whether to illegally risk the lives of its employees can dis-
count the deterrent effect of criminal OSHAct penalties not only by the
employer's chance of escaping conviction if a worker is killed, but also by
the chance that a particular violation will not in fact cause a death. In
light of the limited severity of criminal OSHAct penalties, and of OSHA's
inability to impose a preventative safety program, such double discounting
is unsound statutory policy.
V. Proposals
The shortcomings of the current OSHAct spring not from any single
inadequacy, but from an interrelated collection of flaws. The effectiveness
of the Act would be significantly improved by the implementation of the
following proposals. The proposals are first outlined in their entirety, and
then followed by a discussion of their merits.
105. See generally P. BARTH & H. HUNT, supra note 102, at 114-25.
106. Under 29 U.S.C. § 6660) (1976) a serious violation exists if "there is a substantial
probability that death or serious physical harm could result from a condition which exists. . . in such
place of employment unless the employer did not, and could not with the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence, know of the presence of the violation." It is of course conceivable that a violation could cause a
death even though there existed no substantial probability of such a mishap, but prosecution under
such circumstances is unlikely at best.
107. Such arguments are traditionally associated with tort law. See G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF
ACCIDENTS 69-75 (1970). Because the OSHAct violation itself is an unlawful act, however, a more
apt analogy is to criminal law, wherein result-orientation is relatively common. The result of an
illegal act distinguishes crimes of attempt, for example, and separates manslaughter from reckless
endangerment. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) ("Causal
Relationship Between Conduct and Result; Divergence between Result Designed or Contemplated
and Actual Result or Between Probable and Actual Result").
108. See supra p. 1450 (many such violations are cited civilly); supra note 42 (most cases referred
to Washington for prosecution are ultimately not prosecuted); see also supra note 27 (additional
screening function performed by the Justice Department).
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A. Proposed Statutory Changes
The first proposal is that the use of the criminal law as embodied in
section 666(e) of the Act be abandoned. Its role as OSHA's "teeth" should
be filled in its stead by an augmented system of civil sanctions and reme-
dies. Civil fines under the OSHAct should not only be dramatically in-
creased,"0 9 but should also be supplemented by giving OSHA meaningful
coercive and rehabilitative power-in the form of authority to issue broad
cease-and-desist orders against recidivous violators, and to impose pro-
spective safety and monitoring programs. Unlike OSHA's current injunc-
tive powers under section 662, the proposed capabilities would be neither
interlocutory nor dependent upon the presence of "immediate" or "immi-
nent" danger. 110
As to the criteria for categorizing violations, both the lethality test and
the "willfulness" standards should be dispensed with. The current distinc-
tion between "serious" and "non-serious" violations should be retained.'
1 '
It should be accompanied, however, by only one other statutory standard
for classifying violations: the repeated commission by an employer of seri-
ous violations. While this standard is akin to the extant "repeated" stan-
dard,"1 it is significantly broader. "Repeated" should not require repeti-
tive violations of a single OSHA standard, but should be taken to indicate
inordinate general recidivism, i.e. a particularly high rate of any serious
OSHA violations would qualify an employer as a repeater.'" The pro-
posed "repeated" standard would delineate the only category of violation
to be statutorily identified as subject to extraordinary remedies."" All
other "serious" violations, whether or not they are 'committed "willfully,"
and whether or not they have deadly results, should be treated as a single
109. See supra note 58.
110. Some form of procedurally streamlined emergency powers should be available, but they
should not be subject to the limitations of current "imminent danger" powers. Abatement powers,
which are considerably narrower in scope and application than the proposed powers, should be re-
tained; they perform the useful, if limited, function of forcing the correction of ongoing violations.
Like simple civil citations for other violations, however, fines associated with the abatement power
should be substantially increased.
111. 29 U.S.C. § 6660) (1976). See supra P. 1447.
112. 29 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1976).
113. The concern that an employer be put on notice of its heightened liability is a consideration
often voiced by the OSHRC when confining the definition of "repeated" violations to substantially
similar violations of the same standard. See supra pp. 1465-66. However, a general recidivism stan-
dard would not sacrifice the serving of "notice." The employer that begins to establish a poor record
has notice that it must pay greater attention to OSHA standards in general. Given that all employers
have a legal duty to heed both particular OSHA standards and the "general duty clause," infra note
118, such generalized accountability is not an untoward burden.
114. The definition of a recidivist would of course have to include considerations of the size of the
employer, the general rate of violation in its industry, and the nature of its violations. The "good faith
of the employer," currently given equal statutory status with these other considerations relevant to the
fixing of penalties, 29 U.S.C. § 666(i) (1976), is not of central concern. The measures proposed are
not meant to punish culpability, but to curb unacceptable behavior.
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class of violations.1 s
Once a particular employer has been identified as a recidivist, OSHA
should be empowered to fashion broad remedial measures, and to impose
those measures through administrative orders. Such orders would be
backed up by the threat, in the event that they are disobeyed, of civil and
criminal contempt charges against specific identified corporate officers.116
Such powers should also be flexible, encompassing the authority to impose
safety programs" 7 on recidivist employers that surpass the duties imposed
on non-recidivist employers by ordinary OSHA standards and the "gen-
eral duty clause." 1 8 Where possible, such programs should be enforced
through reporting requirements. If such reports would be either impracti-
cable or ineffective, as where violations are transient or subject to misrep-
resentation," 9 an OSHA safety inspector could be assigned to that em-
ployer, on a full-time or part-time basis, at the employer's expense.
120
115. Considerations currently related to "willfulness," such as duration of violation and employer
awareness, can be included among those various factors that the OSHRC is to consider in setting
fines. Where the OSHRC's judgment on such factors is "supported by substantial evidence," however,
the courts would be obliged to defer to that judgment. See supra p. 1464 (description of the OHSRC's
discretion in setting penalties).
116. Under 29 U.S.C. § 660(b) (1976), any "final order" of the OSHRC, including any uncon-
tested order by OSHA, can be enforced by a decree from the clerk of any federal court of appeals.
Such decrees are enforceable by the courts through the threat of contempt proceedings.
117. The sweeping powers of the NLRB to prevent unfair labor practices are a useful analogy
here. The Board is empowered to:
issue and cause to be served on [the person committing the unfair labor practice] an order
requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such
affirmative action.., as will effectuate the policies of this Act...
29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976). As construed by the Supreme Court:
[t]he Board's power is a broad discretionary one, subject to limited judicial review . .. The
Board's order will not be disturbed 'unless it can be shown that the order is a patent attempt to
achieve ends other than those which can fairly be said to effectuate the policies of the Act.'
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 216 (1964) (case citations omitted).
Of particular interest here are the Board's powers against recidivists, and against "like or related"
practices:
Without doubt the Board has a duty in a litigated case to employ broader and more stringent
remedies against a recidivist than those usually invoked against a first offender, particularly
where normal remedies have proved to be ineffective after earlier proceedings.
Container Systems Corp. v. NLRB, 521 F.2d 1166, 1171 (2d Cir. 1975). See also supra note 32
(discussing NLRB's broad power to prohibit future violations by recidivist unions, even against non-
party employers).
118. The employer's present duties are described in 29 U.S.C. § 654 (1976). Section 654(a), the
so-called "general duty clause," requires that, "[e]ach employer shall furnish to each of his employees
employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or
are likely to cause death or serious physical harm."
119. For example, trench-sloping violations are too ephemeral to be reliably monitored through
written reports, as are violations relating to employee behavior near high-tension lines, on scaffolding,
or in other risky circumstances. Orders requiring broad engineering controls, however, such as those
directed at most airborne contaminants, could be monitored through written reports and only an occa-
sional verification inspection.
120. Given the historically low rate of OSHA inspections, supra note 41, the preventative and
coercive effect of such safety programs would be undermined if findings of non-compliance were de-
pendent on normal inspection and citation procedures. While the powers proposed may seem poten-




The proposals advanced here arise primarily from the conclusion that
the present scheme of OSHAct sanctions and remedies does not work, and
cannot be made to function effectively without significant statutory
changes. In advocating alternative methods for enforcing the OSHAct,
these proposals also point toward changes in policy aims. The primary
basis for selecting violators to be sanctioned extraordinarily, for example,
is shifted from willfulness t9 recidivism. In choosing remedies, harm-based
post-hoc fines are de-emphasized in favor of specific prospective orders. As
to more general aims, the pursuit of retribution is downplayed in the in-
terest of more effective deterrence and rehabilitation. Both policy argu-
ments and feasibility considerations underlie the advocacy of these shifts.
The intention is to direct OSHAct enforcement toward goals which are
more realistic, as well as calculated more adequately to insure safe work-
places; and to empower OSHA with regulatory tools capable of achieving
those goals.
The proposals advanced sacrifice none of the existing deterrent capabil-
ity of the OSHAct's civil sanctions and in fact provide additional deter-
rents. Unlike- a simple abatement order, a broad safety and monitoring
program triggered by repeated violations may impose otherwise avoidable
expenses on an offending employer.' In instances in which a recidivist
employer has reason to fear the implementation of such a program, those
threatened expenses represent an additional deterrent to violation. The
procedural ease, relative to a criminal conviction, with which such an ad-
ministratively ordered safety program could be imposed also adds to the
reliability and likelihood of sanctioning, and so to deterrence. 2"
have shown themselves to be inordinately unresponsive to OSHA's ordinary enforcement deterrents.
121. An abatement order carries no deterrent threat, since it is basically no more than an order to
comply with the employer's responsibilities under the Act. The safety programs described here would
impose particular burdens on the cited employer. Primarily those would be the costs associated with
satisfying OSHA that the employer was actually in compliance. However, OSHA might conclude that
particularly high standards for a specific employer were necessary to achieve acceptable safety levels,
as where an employer had repeatedly expressed hostility to the general purposes of the Act. Under the
proposals herein, such a remedy could be invoked.
122. It could be argued that the dysfunction of the OSHAct criminal sanction has not been abso-
lute, as indicated by the handful of convictions discussed supra pp. 1448-50; and that so long as the
criminal sanction is not totally useless, the introduction into the Act of cease-and-desist orders need
not be accompanied by the eradication of criminal penalties. Whether the criminal sanction has been
totally useless, however, is an open question. Except for the supposed stigma associated with crintinal
conviction of a corporation, see supra note 39 (discounting any distinctive value to such stigmatic
effect), only two criminal convictions have produced penalties not commonly handed out for civil
violations. United States v. Hughey Constr. Corp., Cr. No. 81-16D (W.D. Okla. Feb. 27, 1982);
United States v. Crosby & Overton, No. CR-74-1832-F (C.D. Cal. 1975); see supra p. 1449. Even in
those cases, the extraordinary sanction was not incarceration but probation. Most of the rehabilitative
and deterrent effect of probation, however, would be adequately served by the prospective administra-
tive orders outlined here.
More importantly, the pursuit of criminal sanctions comes at a high cost in terms of both adminis-
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The more central contribution of these proposals is their emphasis on
specific rehabilitation. Whether deliberately or through inadvertence, some
employers show themselves to be particularly unresponsive to the deter-
rents of OSHA enforcement.123 When an employer has so distinguished
itself, the emphasis of enforcement should shift from generalized deter-
rence to specific coercive rehabilitation and prevention. Giving OSHA the
power to issue permanent cease-and-desist orders and to impose compre-
hensive safety programs on repeat violators would give the agency the
tools necessary to pursue such aims. The threat of contempt charges to
effectuate these orders would circumvent problems associated with the
threat of individual criminal liability, such as jury reluctance to convict
and general issues of fairness, 12 4 while still focusing responsibility on par-
ticular corporate officers.
Narrowing the population upon which these remedies are to be focused
also offers enforcement advantages. A focus on recidivism foregoes the em-
phasis on moral culpability inherent in a willfulness test in favor of a
standard which looks directly to the threat to workers posed by a particu-
lar employer. The employer that repeatedly commits serious violations of
the OSHAct, whether willfully or negligently or otherwise, is not re-
trative resources, and ease and predictability of enforcement-a cost justifiable only if criminal sanc-
tions offer some clear benefit. The resources devoted to the twelve cases so far prosecuted, see supra
note 17, and the forty-eight cases referred in the last two years for possible prosecution, see supra note
42, would have been better spent pursuing remedial safety programs, or even civil fines, against a
larger number of employers.
Furthermore, the continued existence of an unused criminal sanction "on the books" would sustain
the illusion that the OSHAct is backed up by the "teeth" of an extraordinary sanction. Neither work-
ers nor policymakers ought to be so misled as to the extent of protection the Act genuinely makes
available.
123. See, e.g., United States v. Dye Constr. Co., No. 73-CR-417 (D. Colo 1974), aftd, 510 F.2d
78 (10th Cir. 1975); Levin reports that Dye had been cited for failure to shore its trenches eleven
times and had had jobs dosed as "imminent dangers" six times in the nine months preceding the
fatality that triggered criminal liability. Levin, supra note 17, at 735. Since that criminal conviction,
Dye Construction has continued to be cited repeatedly. See, e.g., Secretary v. Dye Constr. Co., 6
O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1685 (OSHRC 1978) (failure to shore trenches); Secretary v. Dye Constr. Co., 9
O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1215 (OSHRC 1980) (worker seriously injured by improperly secured 5000-
pound drain cover falling from lift; penalty of $280 for four serious violations). In Empire-Detroit
Steel Div., Detroit Steel Corp. v. OSHRC, 579 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978), defendant had been in-
volved in an extended series of violations over a period of more than two years. Steam explosions in
the employer's steel-making facility, caused by the accumulation of large puddles of coolant water
near slag furnaces, killed a worker in June 1972. After a number of citations for "repeated viola-
tions," a pair of additional explosions in September 1974 injured ten workers. The employer was
fined $10,000 for a willful violation.
OSHA's Compliance Activity Reports are not helpful in providing statistical evidence of recidivism,
because they do not distinguish between willful and repeated violations. See Rothstein, supra note 5,
at 98 n.164 (providing multi-year table (1973-80) of violations charged by OSHA, by degree, based
on Compliance Activity Reports). Some partial evidence of the extent of recidivism is provided by the
ten to twenty cases annually in which a cited employer contests the "repeated" nature of its citation.
Such cases are catalogued each year under classifications 115.051 ct seg. in the Cumulative Digest &
Index of OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH CASES (BNA).
124. See supra pp. 1455-56.
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sponding to the deterrent threats of the Act. It is logically that group of
employers that must be subjected to some remedy other than bare deter-
rence. The current treatment of "repeated violations" in the Act fails to
tailor the remedial response to the selected population, merely pushing the
repeat violator into a more stiffly fined category. In recognition of these
employers' unresponsiveness to the Act's deterrents, this Note proposes
that the Act address recidivism directly, through an individualized compli-
ance and monitoring program.
Conclusion
Violations that are currently subject to the strongest sanctions under the
OSHAct are identified as 1) those in which the employer acts "willfully";
2) those that represent repeated violations of the same standard under
similar circumstances; and 3) "willful" violations that cause the death of
an employee. Under the OSHAct, an inflexible and relatively weak set of
civil sanctions and remedies is supposedly backed up by the threat of
criminal sanctions. The criminal sanction under the OSHAct has not only
been singularly unsuccessful, but has also been employed in pursuit of
goals of questionable value. Punishing an employer on the basis of moral
culpability is neither directly beneficial to workers nor, where the defen-
dant is a corporation, an achievable goal. While individual criminal liabil-
ity for corporate officers may circumvent some of the difficulties associated
with imposing corporate criminal liability, convictions of individuals are
extremely elusive, and deterrence suffers accordingly.
In the absence of a credible or useful threat of criminal sanctions,
OSHA's civil powers are far too restricted to effect the policies of the Act.
This Note proposes supplanting the OSHAct's emphasis on post-hoc fines
with sweeping prospective remedial powers. An employer's recidivism,
rather than an employee death or the employer's "state of mind," would
subject a violator to these extraordinary remedies, since by its recidivism
an employer will have shown itself to be inadequately responsive to the
ordinary deterrents of the Act. The proposed remedial powers focus on
the prospective rehabilitation of a selected population of offenders, favor-
ing the prevention of future harm over the punishment of past acts.
1473
